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Google DeepMind used a multi-agent AI system called AlphaProof Code to mathematically prove security properties of the actual compiled code behind Signal's encryption protocol, a task that usually takes expert teams years. The whole verification took four weeks, with humans reviewing only about one percent of the generated proofs.
- Formal proofs were generated for the real Signal implementation, not just its design, covering over six million lines of Lean code.
- The system was tested by reintroducing two previously fixed bugs, and in both cases it produced a machine-checked proof that the buggy version was insecure.
- Human experts only needed to review about one percent of the codebase, since Lean automatically checks the rest.
Anthropic's red team reports that an internal Claude model traced the origins of the NIST elliptic curve seeds to the lrand48 random number generator seeded with a Unix timestamp, ending a decades-long question about whether the curves were backdoored. The team says the finding shows the curves were generated in a simple, reproducible way.
- The NIST P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 seeds are outputs of the C library's lrand48 generator seeded by Unix timestamps from 1997 to 1998, not a hash of a humorous passphrase as rumored.
- Claude recovered the generator state by spotting a pattern of zero top bits in the seeds, then solving a truncated linear congruential generator using lattice reduction (LLL).
- Some base points, including those of the ANSI X9.62 curves, trace to the FreeLIP and NTL random number generators, but the base points for P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, and the NIST binary curves remain unexplained, as does the B-163 seed.
The Internet's DNS system is replacing its root key-signing key for only the second time on October 11, 2026. Most sites need no action, but validating resolvers must trust the new key beforehand or websites could become unreachable for their users.
- KSK-2024 (key tag 38696) will replace KSK-2017 as the signer of the root's DNSKEY set. Resolvers that don't trust the new key before the switch could make all websites unreachable under any top-level domain for their users.
- The new key has been published since January 2025 to give resolvers time to discover it automatically via RFC 5011, but Cloudflare added it to their resolver software's built-in trust anchors in July 2024 after learning from 2018 rollover failures where upgrades and machine moves caused resolvers to lose learned keys.
- RFC 8509 now lets you test whether your resolver trusts KSK-2024 using a readiness test tool that queries sentinel domains—this capability didn't exist for the 2018 rollover.
- The rollover continues into 2027 when ICANN plans to revoke KSK-2017 and delete its private key. A future algorithm change to ECDSA is planned separately.