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The author, a former theoretical physicist, argues that superintelligence won't cause the explosive economic change rationalists predict, because physical, regulatory, and informational bottlenecks cap how much faster the overall world can move. He uses Amdahl's Law and a widget-factory example to show that speeding up one step rarely speeds up the whole process by much.
- Amdahl's Law: if a process has several sequential bottlenecks, infinitely speeding up one still leaves a constant-factor overall speedup, so exponential gains require repeatedly removing the current bottleneck.
- In the factory example, even with omniscient AI agents working 24/7, a month-long fix only drops to about a week because of shipping times, lab processes, and installing physical hardware.
- Some bits of information are very expensive to acquire (like long-term side-effect data), and regulation and political will are slow speed limits that intelligence doesn't remove.
The author argues that making software cheap is likely to mean much more software, as Jevons predicted for coal in 1865, but that whether the people who build it gain depends on what the new tool does to their specific job. Historical cases like farming, light, bank tellers and telephone operators show the paradox holds for output but can fail for workers.
- Jevons argued in 1865 that efficient engines would increase coal use, and that cheaper products would widen employment, which the coal boom bore out for about fifty years before output collapsed.
- The price elasticity of demand decides the outcome: food (elasticity roughly 0.27 to 0.81) saw the savings leave the industry, while light behaved as if elastic and use rose thousands of times over.
- Bank tellers survived ATMs because branches multiplied, but the job shrank from 600,500 in 2008 to 339,200 in 2025 once mobile banking removed the need to visit, and telephone operators lost 50 to 80% of their jobs almost immediately after mechanical switching.
- Software output already looks like coal in 1865: Google's token processing rose about 330 times in two years, and new repositories and app submissions climbed sharply.
The author argues that LLMs don't meet the criteria that make technologies truly "inevitable" — they can't match human quality at high levels, they only replace low-value work, and they don't deliver the overwhelming performance gains that force adoption. Just because a technology is powerful doesn't mean society has no real choice about using it.
- A technology becomes inevitable only when it massively outperforms alternatives, performs socially valuable work, and leaves no way to neutralize its impact without radical behavioral change. Firearms met all three criteria in medieval Europe; the magnetic compass didn't, and remained optional.
- LLMs can only replace the least valuable parts of knowledge work — mediocre code, superficial research, low-quality design — while human expertise remains essential for anything requiring real quality. The more important the work, the less useful LLMs become.
- Real-world LLM efficiency gains are modest (20-50% improvement in low-stakes work like dashboards) and shrink dramatically as you approach actual business bottlenecks. If LLMs were truly overpowering, we'd already see tech companies producing vastly more output with them.