During a 33-hour window when Automattic's board ousted CEO Matt Mullenweg, two executives signed reciprocal severance deals worth $8.15 million combined. Mullenweg returned and fired them, triggering a legal dispute over whether the agreements are valid.

• CFO Mark Davies and Chief Legal Officer Andy Missan each signed the other's severance agreement on September 10, granting 12 months salary plus accelerated equity vesting — deals that only take effect if they sign broad legal releases and comply with non-compete clauses.
• Davies held no Automattic stock at departure (sold "a few months ago" according to one source) but retained vested stock options, raising questions about his financial motivations during the board action.
• The severance agreements define "cause" so narrowly that Automattic faces a high bar to avoid paying out: the company must notify in writing within 60 days, give 30 days to fix the problem, and secure board majority approval — making legal challenges uncertain.

The article argues that even the best products can fail if companies lack proper corporate governance to guard against profit-driven predators. It reviews Eric Ries’s new book, Incorruptible, which outlines alternative governance structures—like “mission-locked” setups—to protect founders, culture, and long-term vision.

• Great products regularly fail not from market rejection but because investors/boards oust founders and erode culture once a product shows promise
• Traditional corporate governance (as designed by lawyers and business schools) makes companies vulnerable to hostile takeovers and mission drift, rather than protecting them
• Eric Ries's book "Incorruptible" proposes "mission-locked" governance structures that keep companies tied to their founding purpose regardless of investor changes
• Real companies have already implemented these mission-locked safeguards from inception, suggesting governance design deserves as much attention as the product roadmap

This piece breaks down The New Yorker’s 18,000-word deep dive into Sam Altman’s trust issues and OpenAI’s turbulent history—from his firing and secret “shadow board” deal to safety disputes and the botched investigation into his conduct. It highlights key conflicts with Musk, Dario Amodei, Microsoft’s unauthorized India release, and a fleeting “sell to Putin” brainstorm.

• Sutskever compiled seventy pages of vanishing Slack messages to justify firing Altman and Brockman, but much of that evidence was kept hidden from the public.
• The Summers/Taylor investigation into Altman's conduct never produced a written report, leaving insiders still pushing for a real probe.
• Microsoft quietly inserted a merger veto into OpenAI's charter, killing the "merge-and-assist" safety clause Amodei had fought for—he only found out at the last minute, contributing to his and Daniela's 2020 exit to found Anthropic.
• Altman denied key details reporters uncovered, including the informal "shadow board" pact with Brockman and Sutskever, despite responding to deception allegations with "I can't change my personality."

This article breaks down The New Yorker’s 18,000-word exposé on Sam Altman and OpenAI, detailing boardroom coups, safety disputes, secret pacts, and clashes with Musk, Amodei, and others. It then covers OpenAI’s policy “new deal” proposal and their acquisition of TBPN.

• Sutskever compiled seventy pages of Slack messages before Altman's firing, arguing he and Brockman shouldn't lead the company
• Musk, Altman, and Brockman had a secret pact that Altman would step down if both Brockman and Sutskever asked—Musk allegedly broke it by building a shadow leadership team
• A merger-blocking clause was quietly inserted into OpenAI's charter during Microsoft's investment, contradicting a "merge-and-assist" safety provision Amodei had demanded—Altman denied its existence until forced to read it aloud
• Summers and Taylor's promised investigation into Altman was narrowed to only assess criminality, produced no public report, and cleared him without most board members ever seeing a briefing

The article details the internal conflict at OpenAI that led to CEO Sam Altman's firing, driven by concerns from board member Ilya Sutskever about Altman's honesty and safety protocols. After a swift backlash from employees and investors, Altman was reinstated just days later, highlighting the tensions around leadership and trust in AI development.

• Ilya Sutskever secretly compiled evidence (using disappearing messages) accusing Altman of lying and misrepresenting safety protocols, believing OpenAI was close to human-level AI and doubting Altman's fitness to control it.
• The board fired Altman citing lack of candor, but the decision blindsided major stakeholders like Microsoft and was made without a fully airtight public case.
• Altman rapidly mobilized allies (Ron Conway, Brian Chesky), framed the firing as a coup by "effective altruists" fearful of AI, and used investor leverage (Thrive suspending its funding deal) to pressure the board.
• Near-unanimous employee threats to resign forced the board to reverse course within days, showing employee and investor power outweighed the board's safety concerns.