The piece examines whether Dario Amodei and other AI executives pushing for AI regulation are victims of regulatory capture—the classic pattern where industries co-opt their regulators over time. The author traces how this typically works: a company lobbies Congress, hires former regulators, trains future ones, supplies the agency with information it needs. As the regulator matures, accommodation replaces confrontation. The ICC is the textbook case—created to regulate railroads but eventually protected them from trucking competition. Crucially, this process unfolds slowly in backrooms, not through visible battles. But the author argues the facts don't fit this narrative when applied to Amodei. If regulatory capture were happening, you'd expect the AI industry to oppose most regulations. Instead, Amodei supports rules that would reduce AI profits. The author notes that claiming this is hidden self-interest requires "epistemically painful Ptolemaic epicycles"—basically, you have to keep adding exceptions to make the theory work. A simpler explanation: Amodei actually believes what he's saying. He may want something like a regulated monopoly (resembling old AT&T), but that's not the same as capture. The comments reveal real disagreements. Some readers remain suspicious, arguing that working from within an industry to control political outcomes is regulatory capture by another name, mixing profit motives with power over information access. Others cite China's strict AI framework as a counterpoint, suggesting different regulatory approaches exist. One commenter notes that AI companies currently face high input costs due to inelastic supply of chips and researchers, which could change the economic calculus entirely.