Omid Malekan tackles misconceptions surrounding stablecoins and their effects on the banking sector. He argues that fears about stablecoins shrinking bank deposits are unfounded. In fact, stablecoin growth has been linked to increased U.S. bank deposits, primarily driven by demand from international users who need access to dollars. Major stablecoin issuers back their tokens with Treasury bills and bank deposits, meaning that more stablecoins can lead to higher deposits in banks. The legislation supporting stablecoins, like the Genius Act, aims to enhance dollar adoption, further bolstering bank deposits. Malekan also addresses the notion that stablecoins threaten banks' ability to provide credit. He points out that competition for deposits might affect bank profits, but it doesn’t necessarily hinder lending capacity. Banks are currently enjoying high net-interest margins, and they can easily raise interest rates for savers to compete for deposits. With around $3 trillion in reserves at the Federal Reserve, banks have ample room to offset any withdrawals triggered by stablecoin adoption. He emphasizes that the banking industry, while profitable, can adapt without stifling credit availability. Another myth is that banks are the primary source of credit in the U.S. However, they only account for about 20% of the credit market, with non-bank lenders playing a significant role. Malekan highlights that stablecoin adoption could actually lower borrowing costs. As stablecoins facilitate quicker and cheaper transactions, they may enhance efficiency in lending practices. Furthermore, since many loans are tied to Treasury rates, increased demand driven by stablecoins could lead to lower rates for borrowers. The article concludes by stressing the importance of both savers and borrowers in the economy. Limiting stablecoin issuers from sharing their financial structures could harm savers, particularly retirees relying on interest income. Malekan argues that a balanced approach is necessary, one that considers the needs of both groups without favoring one at the expense of the other.