Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) has long been viewed as a strong defense against account breaches, but attackers have adapted their methods, often bypassing MFA through a technique called Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing. Instead of stealing credentials, these attacks exploit authenticated sessions. The attacker waits for a user to log in and then hijacks that session, using a reverse proxy to relay information between the user and the legitimate site without any detection. This shift in tactics makes traditional MFA less effective because it fundamentally relies on the trust established post-authentication. A recent incident reviewed by Surya Teja illustrates this point. In one environment, a successful AiTM attack occurred despite the presence of MFA. The attackers were able to capture session tokens after the user completed their authentication. However, timely detection during the session limited the damage. Immediate actions included revoking sessions and tightening security policies, preventing any significant data loss. In contrast, another environment implemented phishing-resistant MFA using FIDO2 security keys. This approach prevented the attackers from leveraging the same tactics because the keys cryptographically bind authentication to a physical hardware device, rendering the session replay ineffective. The difference between the two environments highlights the importance of evolving security measures. While MFA can still play a role in securing accounts, organizations must recognize its limitations and adopt more robust methods that resist modern identity-first attacks. The article emphasizes that detection strategies need to focus on correlating identity telemetry with post-authentication behavior to catch these subtle attacks before they escalate.