The article uncovers a significant weakness in the Linux kernel's address space layout randomization (KASLR) on Pixel devices. Researchers found that, due to the static nature of physical memory allocation in these devices, the kernel’s virtual memory addresses can be predicted. Specifically, the PHYS_OFFSET is fixed at 0x80000000, making the conversion from physical to virtual addresses straightforward. This static mapping undermines KASLR, which is meant to increase security by randomizing memory addresses. The lack of randomization means that attackers can easily calculate the virtual addresses of kernel data, even when KASLR is supposedly enabled. Furthermore, the article explains that the Pixel bootloader decompresses the kernel at a consistent physical address (0x80010000) across reboots. This consistency allows for the direct calculation of kernel .data entries' virtual addresses, such as the modprobe_path string, which can be accessed reliably at 0xffffff8001ff2398. While the KASLR is designed to protect against such predictable access, the static nature of the memory mapping on Pixel devices renders it ineffective. Even on devices with randomized kernel addresses, the non-randomization of the linear mapping still poses a security risk. Attackers can exploit predictable physical addresses to control memory allocation, allowing them to reference kernel virtual address spaces easily. The article highlights an experiment conducted on a Samsung S23, demonstrating how frequently certain physical page frame numbers could be allocated, further illustrating the vulnerability that exists due to the interplay between memory management features and the static memory mappings on devices like the Pixel.