@WillManidis - Endgame Thinking Skips
@WillManidis on X The author argues that modern chess, war, and tech have all collapsed their openings and middlegames into recitation, rushing to a foreseen endgame. He uses Elon Musk's interview with Dwarkesh Patel as the main example, and ties the habit to a Christian case for patience with the long middle of history.
- Grandmasters now spend about 5% of thinking time on openings, versus Kasparov's 40% burned before the middlegame in his 1985 match with Karpov, and Carlsen quit classical chess partly out of boredom with memorized lines.
- Musk treats every bottleneck (power, chips, mass to orbit) as something to eliminate on the way to a terminal AI future, and does the same with questions about human-AI relations, which the author says is where the method breaks.
- Confusing the ability to simulate an endgame with being close to one makes work feel urgent, and the author argues the middle of history is long and people should play it well instead.
The core argument is that modern life, from chess to war to tech, has stopped playing the opening and middlegame and rushes straight to the endgame. The article opens with the 1985 Kasparov-Karpov Game 24 in Moscow, where Kasparov, 22 and needing only a draw to win the match at 12-11, spent around 40 percent of his clock before the middlegame, with seconds hand-mining Sicilian Najdorf lines in smoky hotel rooms because no real engines existed. Today a typical grandmaster spends maybe 5 percent of thinking time on the opening, and Magnus Carlsen quit classical world championship chess in 2023 citing boredom with memorized computer lines. The author's claim is that this pattern is now everywhere.
The war examples carry most of the weight. The author contrasts 1914, when the Schlieffen Plan's failure at the Marne locked armies into trenches for fifty months, and Eisenhower's years of agonizing over Normandy versus Calais, the deception campaigns, and the June 6 call, with today's strikes that the author describes as recited scripts: bombing rubble in Yemen, the Fordow dispute and the Al Udeid strike in Iran, months of boat strikes and a staged abduction in Venezuela. The Donbas, by contrast, is still a grinding middlegame, a Somme with drones where the trenches have not moved in three years. The author's worry is that precise, low-risk operations, like a 22-operator JSOC raid instead of a million-man invasion, make the decision to start a war feel cheap, because the opening that used to carry the stakes has been engineered out.
The third section applies the same frame to Elon Musk's Cheeky Pints interview with Dwarkesh Patel. Patel asks positional questions about powering orbital data centers, servicing GPUs in orbit, solar costs, and building a terawatt of chips by 2030. Musk keeps jumping to the terminal state, from a lunar mass driver launching satellites at 2.5 km/s to a TeraFab he will "figure out," treating each bottleneck as something to eliminate rather than inhabit. The author grants that this method has worked at SpaceX and Tesla, with steel over carbon fiber and booster catches, but says it breaks down on questions about human-AI relations, where "I'll tell Grok to care" stands in for an actual plan. The closing argument is that simulation compresses whatever it can model, pushing human effort into whatever it cannot, and the author suggests this dynamic will only intensify.