Obituaries – Stratechery by Ben Thompson

Open original

Ben Thompson's column runs a series of "obituaries" for Jensen Huang's tenure at Nvidia, Intel's founding-era independence, and the government's growing say over AI chips. The through-line is that the state, not the company, now sets the rules on who gets advanced chips.

  • Huang resigned as Nvidia CEO on November 12, 2026, with the article citing affairs as the public trigger, alongside whispers about a Chinese intermediary called Megaspeed.
  • Nvidia's A800 was an A100 with a third of its interconnects disabled, released right after the 2022 export controls to keep selling into China.
  • Thompson argues Treasury Secretary Bessent's view that Nvidia should act like a bank, enforcing the spirit of chip bans itself, marks a shift from Intel-era norms of company independence.

Jensen Huang resigned as CEO of Nvidia on November 12, 2026, ending a run that began when he co-founded the company at a Denny's on April 5, 1993. The piece frames his career as a long stretch of obscurity among gamers followed by a late rise to rock-star status, and then a fall tied to politics. Nvidia had no real presence in Washington or Beijing when the Biden administration imposed chip export controls in 2022. Nvidia's response was to release the A800 for China, essentially an A100 with a third of its interconnects disabled, to stay within the rules while keeping the market. The author says the resignation followed publicly reported affairs, including one with Alice Huang, an executive at Megaspeed, a company said to be in the chip-export business and possibly serving Chinese military customers. The author is careful to call the military link whispers, not established fact. The more substantive part of the article is a set of arguments about China and the chip ban. The author lays out two camps: AI safety advocates who see advanced AI as uncontrollable and want alignment, loosely associated with Anthropic, and China hawks who treat chip access as a national security question and regard exports to China as close to treason. Within that debate, the author lists five ways China could reduce Nvidia's dominance: building a serious CUDA alternative that eventually competes globally, using distilled frontier-model outputs to produce open-weight models tuned for Nvidia hardware (which actually strengthens Nvidia's leverage over Western labs), pursuing optical interconnects for training clusters that are less power-efficient but workable given China's capacity to generate electricity, and eventually building a separate semiconductor supply chain that weakens Nvidia's grip on the Western one. The closing sections draw a contrast with the founding of Intel in 1968, when Robert Noyce and Arthur Rock pushed for a commercial, customer-driven chip company instead of depending on the government, then the largest chip buyer. Against that history, the author cites a Financial Times report that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent thinks Nvidia needs a shake-up and should treat the chip ban as its own obligation to honor in spirit, not merely the letter. The author sides with the view that if AI is as significant as claimed, government will insist on a say, and that Huang, whatever his private objections, had a duty to accept the export restrictions as the law.

Ask about this article