This Critical Lesson in MySpace's Failure is Still Relevant Today — Chris Neumann
Chris Neumann, who managed Aster Data's biggest account, argues that MySpace lost to Facebook partly because its founders insisted every hire move to LA and refused to recruit from Silicon Valley. He uses that failure to urge founders outside the Bay Area to honestly assess their local talent pool before scaling.
- MySpace insisted all staff be based in LA, and local talent in 2006-2007 couldn't meet its growth needs, while Bay Area candidates refused to relocate.
- The company opened a San Francisco office only in late 2007, after lowering its hiring bar, and by then it was too late to compete with Facebook.
- Neumann's takeaway is practical: ask where your local talent is strong or weak, whether it can scale with you, and whether it has built globally competitive companies before.
MySpace in 2006 was the most visited site on the internet, pulling nearly 5% of all US internet visits, and it was Aster Data's flagship customer. The author, who managed that relationship, spent almost two years flying weekly between San Francisco and LA to help bring the world's first 100TB commercial data warehouse into production. He describes MySpace's engineering team as the best he'd met in Silicon Valley, with conversations on infrastructure, data analysis, and privacy well ahead of anything else he'd encountered. At that point Facebook had only recently opened beyond US universities, and Twitter was a few months old.
The trouble was the founders' insistence that every employee work in LA. They wanted to build the city's first massive tech company, but LA's startup scene was young and had little experienced homegrown talent. Bay Area engineers, meanwhile, saw a move south as abandoning tech relevance, a view shaped by the NorCal-SoCal rivalry of the time. Rather than open an office up north, as other leading startups were doing, MySpace doubled down. Within about two years, the author says, it went from hiring the best to hiring people who wouldn't have cleared the first interview. When Facebook competition heated up, MySpace lacked the people to respond. It opened a San Francisco office only in late 2007, which was too late.
The author's takeaway is not that every startup must move to Silicon Valley, but that founders need to judge their local talent pool honestly. He suggests asking where local talent is strong and where it's weak, whether the pool is big enough for the company's growth, and whether anyone locally has built a high-growth, globally competitive company. He gives examples: Canada has strong engineers but thin sales, marketing, and executive talent; Central and Eastern Europe has excellent engineers but limited product people; Scotland's pool is small enough that companies must look to England or Europe at scale. He is blunt that few people outside the US have seen a global tech company through from founding to exit, and that roles at Uber Canada or Facebook's country offices don't count as that experience. He also notes that local investors, politicians, and media pressure founders toward homegrown success, making outside hiring harder. His final warning is that every fast-growing company outside Silicon Valley faces the choice of hiring a locally available but unqualified person or looking where the talent is, and that they will be competing against him and his friends.