The Jevons paradox has a second half

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The author argues that making software cheap is likely to mean much more software, as Jevons predicted for coal in 1865, but that whether the people who build it gain depends on what the new tool does to their specific job. Historical cases like farming, light, bank tellers and telephone operators show the paradox holds for output but can fail for workers.

  • Jevons argued in 1865 that efficient engines would increase coal use, and that cheaper products would widen employment, which the coal boom bore out for about fifty years before output collapsed.
  • The price elasticity of demand decides the outcome: food (elasticity roughly 0.27 to 0.81) saw the savings leave the industry, while light behaved as if elastic and use rose thousands of times over.
  • Bank tellers survived ATMs because branches multiplied, but the job shrank from 600,500 in 2008 to 339,200 in 2025 once mobile banking removed the need to visit, and telephone operators lost 50 to 80% of their jobs almost immediately after mechanical switching.
  • Software output already looks like coal in 1865: Google's token processing rose about 330 times in two years, and new repositories and app submissions climbed sharply.

Jevons, in his 1865 book The Coal Question, argued that making coal use more efficient would make Britain burn more of it, not less. Cheaper iron meant more blast furnaces, and total coal use rose even as each ton of iron needed far less fuel. Steam engine efficiency improved roughly tenfold between the 1769 atmospheric engines and the average Cornish engine of 1859, yet British coal output kept climbing, peaking at 292 million tonnes in 1913. The part people usually skip is that Jevons made the same argument about labor: cheaper products widen demand so much that employment eventually grows. The author uses this to explain why AI-driven drops in the cost of writing software probably won't shrink software jobs. Their own evidence is concrete: in about three weeks, an overnight agent built 22 small programs, including a three-country tax calculator and a child support calculator that would have been a team's quarter's work in 2020. The optimism has a track record but also limits. Light got over 3,000 times cheaper in Britain from 1800 to 2000, and use rose far faster than the price fell, so the savings went back into more lighting. Food went the other way. American farm employment fell from 41% of the workforce in 1900 to 1.9% in 2000, because people simply don't eat several times more dinner when it gets cheaper. The deciding variable is price elasticity of demand: above 1, cheaper goods mean more total spending and more jobs; below 1, the savings leave the industry. A review of 160 studies puts food between 0.27 and 0.81. Steve Sorrell's 2007 UK review found that rebound effects are usually modest, and that backfire, where total consumption actually rises, is most likely with general-purpose technologies early in their spread, like steam and electric motors. The author argues AI-assisted coding fits that profile. The author's real warning is the second half of the paradox, which Jevons couldn't see. Coal employment peaked around 1913, with 1.1 million people across 3,024 mines, and British deep-mined output has since fallen to roughly zero. Bank tellers are a more mixed case. James Bessen showed ATMs cut the staff per urban branch from 20 to 13 between 1988 and 2004, and banks opened more branches, so teller jobs held up for a while. Then mobile banking and phone deposits drove the count from about 600,000 in 2008 to 339,200 in 2025, with another 13% drop projected by 2035. Telephone operators declined faster still. The lesson the author takes is that the paradox holds only while demand keeps expanding, and the people doing the work tend to see the turn first.

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