Cognitive Mercantilism
Venkatesh Rao uses Joyce Appleby's history of capitalism to argue that fears about AI replacing human thinking repeat the zero-sum logic of pre-capitalist mercantilism. He suggests that just as agricultural gains freed most people from farming, AI could free people from cognitive labor and let them become consumers of intelligence rather than its producers.
- Mercantilism assumed wealth was fixed and that ordinary people couldn't be trusted with freedom; Rao maps both assumptions onto "cognitive mercantilism," where intelligence is hoarded and treated as scarce.
- Appleby documents a "industrious revolution" in Britain, with work days rising from about 250 to 300 a year, driven partly by voluntary desire for new consumer goods like tea, sugar, and tobacco, well before the Industrial Revolution.
- Rao argues the analogous path for AI is that most people won't need to produce intelligence to benefit from it, just as few people today farm yet eat abundantly.
Venkatesh Rao uses Joyce Appleby's *The Relentless Revolution* (2010) as a lens on AI anxiety. Appleby's core claim is that capitalism wasn't a natural human instinct but a contingent cultural invention, one that required people to abandon a zero-sum mercantilist worldview. Mercantilism assumed wealth was finite, consisting of land, bullion, and captured labor; that the poor needed coercive governance; that economics was about controlling supply while demand from ordinary people barely registered; and that most people were fit only for farm work. Capitalism took hold once people discovered wealth could be created and that ordinary people were sources of demand and initiative.
Rao's move is to map this onto what he calls "cognitive mercantilism." Intelligence gets treated as a fixed stock to hoard, like bullion. Elites assume the masses can't be trusted with it. Supply gets all the attention while demand from less-credentialed people goes unnoticed. And the 80 percent of people not doing high-grade cognitive work get written off as surplus once machines take over. Rao's counterpoint comes from agriculture: the farming revolution cut the share of people needed to grow food from a large majority to a tiny minority in advanced economies, and the result was not mass uselessness but a world where far more people could do other things while eating far better. He points out that he can't farm and barely keeps a houseplant alive, yet his food supply is abundant. The analogous hope is that most people can become large consumers of AI-produced intelligence without needing to produce much themselves.
The middle section turns to Appleby's account of the "industrious revolution" in Britain before industrialization. Between roughly the 1600s and 1800s, the number of days people worked annually rose from something like 250 to 300, and a large part of this was voluntary, driven by desire for newly available goods like tobacco, tea, sugar, and Indian cottons. Rising productivity generated surplus income, surplus income fed demand, and demand spurred further productivity, a feedback loop that ran about a century ahead of organized labor and socialism as political forces. Rao suggests this consumer-desire dynamic, rather than coercion, is the more relevant precedent for how AI-era demand might develop, and he argues that by the late twentieth century this logic had become the global default. The piece is an extended argument that fears of mass cognitive obsolescence repeat the same zero-sum assumptions that capitalism once overturned.