Whither the Intellectual?; Before the Fall; Kwaidan
Short summary
The author dismantles a recurring historical claim that Léon Blum's left-wing government weakened France by implementing the 40-hour work week, showing instead that French rearmament was actually a substantial success by 1940. The piece traces how this myth originated with Vichy propaganda and persists today in arguments against labor protections and AI regulation.
- French military spending tripled from 1935 to 1939 (12.8 billion to 93.7 billion francs), and by early 1940 France and Britain combined were outproducing Germany in warplane manufacturing.
- The 40-hour week blame originated as Vichy propaganda under Pétain, who scapegoated labor reforms for military failure to shift responsibility from incompetent officers to the left and Jews.
- Modern versions of this myth are being recycled in contemporary debates—a recent Substack essay uses it to argue against AI regulation restrictions.
Full summary
The piece opens with housekeeping—the author mentions his book *When the Clock Broke* is now in paperback and available globally, plus he co-hosts a film podcast with Jamelle Bouie. He recommends a podcast episode from the LRB where Will Davies and James Butler examine what separates actual intellectuals from technocrats, academics, and thought leaders. The discussion touches on Weber and Gramsci's ideas about intellectual autonomy, Hayek's anti-intellectualism, and how algorithmic platforms affect independent thought. The author notes this connects to his earlier writing on right-wing intellectuals but also made him question whether he himself deserves the label.
The real substance comes in his takedown of a Substack essay circulating online. The piece, written by someone from The Centre for British Progress and an economics student, rehashes the old argument that Léon Blum's left-wing government crippled France by implementing a 40-hour work week just as Nazi rearmament demanded maximum productivity. This blame-the-labor-movement narrative traces back to Vichy propaganda—Pétain blamed the "spirit of pleasure" over "spirit of sacrifice" for national decline, and his government even prosecuted Blum at the Riom Trial in 1942 to shift responsibility from incompetent military commanders to civilian leaders. The author notes the irony of French officers blaming a Jewish politician for military failure.
The problem with this argument is it collapses under historical evidence. Philip Nord's research shows France actually achieved rough numerical parity with Germany in tanks and was rapidly expanding aircraft production faster than the Nazis could match. By early 1940, France and Britain combined were producing more warplanes than Germany. France's military budget exploded from 12.8 billion francs in 1935 to 93.7 billion in 1939—2.6 times the spending increase before World War I—and the new weaponry was respectable in quality. The 40-hour week didn't hobble rearmament; France managed substantial military buildup despite it.