Will Taiwan Just Give Up?

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Taiwan's opposition party is negotiating a deal with Xi Jinping to abandon independence claims and stop military preparations, betting that accommodation with China is safer than relying on an unpredictable Trump administration that's stretched thin by the Iran war and skeptical of defending distant allies.

  • Taiwan's Nationalist Party, which controls Parliament, is blocking defense spending and has signaled willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in exchange for preserved elections and autonomy, modeled loosely on Hong Kong's arrangement before Beijing dismantled its democracy.
  • Trump has publicly questioned the value of defending Taiwan, called weapons sales a "negotiating chip" rather than a strategic commitment, and praised Xi as a friend—signaling the U.S. may not intervene if China moves militarily.
  • A Chinese invasion would likely succeed within weeks without sustained U.S. resupply; early losses would exceed 20 years of Iraq-Afghanistan casualties, and the blockade would wipe trillions from global markets, yet Taiwan's population increasingly sees resistance as futile.

Xi Jinping is making a calculated play for Taiwan through diplomatic charm and military pressure. He hosted Taiwan's Nationalist Party chair Cheng Li-wun in Beijing in April, serving her the same soup Nixon ate during his 1972 opening to China—a deliberate signal that reconciliation between Taiwan and mainland China could follow the same historic pattern. Xi smiled, told jokes, wore a blue tie (Taiwan's Nationalist color), and essentially offered Cheng a deal: Taiwan drops its independence claim, stops preparing for war, and moves toward reunification with the mainland. The message was wrapped in talk of shared culture and family bonds, but the underlying threat remained clear. China has spent decades preparing a military assault on Taiwan that would begin with cyberattacks on the power grid and communications, followed by missiles and drones targeting military infrastructure, before troops storm the beaches. Taiwan's 200,000 active personnel could hold out briefly, but a full defense would require U.S. resupply through a Chinese naval blockade—a scenario that could kill tens of thousands on both sides and wipe trillions from global markets. Taiwan's confidence in American protection has collapsed. When I visited this spring, nearly everyone I spoke with—politicians, military veterans, ordinary citizens—described the U.S. as "unpredictable." The Iran war launched in February drained two-thirds of America's advanced air-defense systems and forced warships away from Asia, making a Taiwan defense look increasingly implausible. Cheng's Nationalist Party has exploited this skepticism by blocking defense spending in Parliament, particularly stalling domestic drone production and other cheap weapons that worked well in Ukraine. They're betting that Taiwan cannot win a war alone, so why prepare for one? Even Cheng's political opponents acknowledge the Iran war has left America less capable of defending Taiwan. Cheng and Xi have kept their actual deal vague in public, talking about shared identity and peaceful coexistence while dodging hard questions about what freedoms Taiwan would retain. When pressed about Hong Kong, where China dismantled democratic institutions, Cheng claimed Taiwan would get better terms—free elections as long as winners don't push independence. Trump appears open to this arrangement. The calculation is stark: Taiwan faces a choice between preparing for a war it probably cannot win alone or accepting a negotiated surrender disguised as family reconciliation, and right now the surrender looks like the safer bet.

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