Forget Everything Else. Find Product-Market Fit.

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Nicholas, CEO of Rillet, explains why he chose to build an ERP system despite a history of failed challengers to QuickBooks and NetSuite, and how his team spent two to three years in stealth shipping micro-launches before finding product-market fit. He argues founders should cut anything that doesn't touch customers or revenue, and that a narrow wedge product is easier to sell and support than a broad platform.

  • He bet on execution rather than a speculative trend: he already knew the problem from a previous job and had a rough shape of the solution.
  • Stealth worked only because they ran multiple micro-launches with real customers, which exposed them to negative feedback that five close friends never would.
  • He recommends launching with a wedge that leads into the bigger platform, since a wide ERP surface area creates support load and code interdependencies that drown small teams quickly.

Nicholas, CEO and co-founder of Rillet, is building an ERP (enterprise resource planning) system to challenge incumbents like QuickBooks and NetSuite. He's candid that the category had a graveyard of failed attempts when he started, and that the early pushback centered on one question: nobody has done this before, so how do you know you can execute? His answer was that he had firsthand experience with the problem from a previous job, knew roughly what the solution had to look like, and was betting on his team's execution rather than on a market trend that might or might not arrive. The product is hard to build for reasons beyond UI and UX. The real difficulty is domain knowledge: accounting nuances that are deeply ingrained in practitioners and hard to find in public forums, which means even an AI agent would struggle to capture how a customer's accounting operations actually work. Rillet spent two to three years in stealth, which Nicholas admits goes against common startup advice. His defense is that stealth didn't mean isolation. The team ran multiple micro-launches with different customer types, put working product in front of real users, and absorbed harsh criticism along the way. He argues that testing against the market, not just against five close friends, is essential, and that a big public announcement can come later. On finding product-market fit, he leaned on Marc Andreessen's line that if you're wondering whether you have it, you probably don't. He says the signs became unmistakable roughly a year before the interview: more inbound demand than the team could handle, sales calls stacking up, and customer volume outpacing support capacity. He also stresses that founders should be brutally honest with themselves about whether they're winning because the product is truly better, and should cut any activity, such as panels or media appearances, that doesn't touch customers or revenue. On strategy, Nicholas describes ERP as a boring but lucrative horizontal category where every company needs software and spends heavily on it. That breadth is a problem for go-to-market, since a buyer expects a wide product surface area before they'll seriously consider switching, which is a big reason the team stayed in stealth so long while shipping relentlessly. The interview ends with a thin thread about founder schedules and investor fit. The practical takeaway is less about the specifics of his timeline and more about the discipline he describes: validate with real customers early, be ruthless about what counts as progress, and trust your own read on execution over outside consensus.

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